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David Álvarez Rosa has made his website available as a Tor hidden service, giving it an address reachable inside the Tor network. His report describes a setup that serves a separate static-site build through Tor while keeping the web server on a local port; it does not establish how many people use the new address or what effect it has had.

David Álvarez Rosa says his personal website is now reachable as a Tor hidden service, adding an address that works inside the Tor network alongside the site’s regular internet version. The change matters as a concrete example of a site operator making a publication available without exposing the web server’s public IP address through the hidden-service connection.

In his report, Álvarez Rosa says the site’s .onion address resolves only within Tor. He describes the address as derived from a public key, with Tor providing end-to-end encryption for the connection. A visitor needs the Tor Browser or another Tor-enabled setup to open it; the address is not a conventional domain that resolves through public DNS.

The report describes Tor forwarding requests for the hidden service to a web server listening on a local port. The server returns the website’s files, while the hidden-service configuration keeps its private key and generated hostname in a dedicated directory owned by Tor. Álvarez Rosa says that directory must be separate from the site’s web root, where the public-facing files are stored.

The site is static, so its build process also needed a change. Álvarez Rosa says absolute links in the regular version would otherwise direct Tor visitors back to the public internet domain. His deployment pipeline now builds separate copies for the regular site and Tor, using the onion address as the base URL for the Tor copy, then deploys each version to its own web root. He says this happens automatically on each push to the site’s repository.

At a glance
announcementWhen: Announced in the source report; no publ…
The developmentDavid Álvarez Rosa has published a Tor hidden-service version of his personal website alongside its regular internet site.

A Second Route to the Site

The development gives readers a way to reach this particular site through Tor, where the network is designed to make it harder for a single observer to link a visitor’s identity with the service being accessed. A hidden service also aims to conceal the server’s location from visitors. Those properties may be useful to publishers and readers concerned about tracking, surveillance or censorship, though the report does not measure any change in privacy or access for this site’s audience.

The arrangement also illustrates a practical point for website operators: publishing an onion version can require changes to hosting and site generation, even when the underlying content is static. The Tor address, local server listener and separate build must work together. The author presents automation as a way to keep the two published versions in sync, rather than describing a change to the site’s content or a move away from its regular address.

How the Tor Version Works

Tor sends traffic through a network of volunteer-run relays, encrypting it as it passes between them. Álvarez Rosa describes a hidden service as extending anonymity to the server side of a connection. The report says the onion address requires no certificate authority or public DNS record, and that the server’s public IP is not exposed through the hidden-service address. These are descriptions of the system’s design, not a claim that every aspect of a visitor’s or operator’s activity is anonymous in all circumstances.

The implementation keeps the website itself on a local web server and has Tor direct requests to it. The server serves plain HTTP on that local connection; the author says TLS, HTTP/2 and QUIC are not used for this path because Tor carries the traffic over TCP and supplies encryption for the connection. The report also points readers to a homelab repository and a site repository for fuller configuration details. Its main development is the publication of this site on Tor, not a new Tor feature or a change announced by the Tor Project.

““This site is now reachable over Tor as a hidden service.””

— David Álvarez Rosa, in the supplied report

Audience and Privacy Limits

The supplied report does not give a publication date, visitor figures, or evidence of how many people have accessed the onion version. It also does not describe a formal security review, independent verification of the configuration, or the site’s performance under load. The stated privacy properties explain how Tor is intended to work; they do not establish that use of this particular site makes every action by its visitors or operator untraceable.

It is also unclear whether the author plans to expand the Tor version, add more services, or keep both versions available indefinitely. The report describes the site’s current arrangement and deployment process, but offers no timeline for further changes.

Both Versions Stay in Sync

According to Álvarez Rosa, the next update path is already part of the site’s regular publishing workflow: a push triggers builds for both the public internet and Tor, then deploys them to separate locations. Readers who want to use the Tor version can open its onion address in Tor Browser; those using the regular site can continue to access its conventional address.

No further launch milestone or follow-up announcement is specified in the supplied report. The practical next indicator will be whether the automated pipeline continues to publish matching updates to both versions. The author also encourages readers to support the Tor Project or run a relay, but the report does not state that either action is required to access the site.

Key Questions

What changed?

Álvarez Rosa’s website now has a version reachable through a Tor hidden-service address, in addition to its regular internet version.

How can readers open the Tor version?

Readers need the Tor Browser or another Tor-enabled setup. The supplied report gives an onion address, which resolves inside the Tor network rather than through public DNS.

Does the report say the website moved off the regular internet?

No. It describes two copies, one for the regular internet and one for Tor, with separate builds and web roots.

What is not known about the launch?

The supplied material does not provide a publication date, audience numbers, or independent review of the setup. It also does not say whether additional changes are planned.

Source: hn

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